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In 1953,Watson and Crick not only described the double-helix structure of DNA, but also embraced
the idea that genes contained a code that expresses information and thereby changed our view
of life. This article traces how these ideas entered biological thinking and highlights the connections
between different branches of science at the time, exploring the power of metaphor in science.Introduction
Sixty years ago, James Watson and
Francis Crick described the double-helix
structure of DNA. The double helix
famously led them to state that ‘‘it has
not escaped our notice that the specific
pairing we have postulated immediately
suggests a possible copying mechanism
for the genetic material.’’ However, repli-
cation is merely one aspect of the heredi-
tary substance, one that is shared by
some forms of nonliving matter, like crys-
tals. The key thing about the DNA mole-
cule was revealed in their next paper,
which appeared in Nature 6 weeks later
(Watson and Crick, 1953). The conceptual
breakthrough they announced in this sec-
ond paper changed humanity’s vision of‘‘Spirals Time—Time Spirals’’ by Charles Jencks is a large sculpture
of a DNA double helix, and it was donated by Jim Watson to Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory in 2000. Image courtesy of Chua/CSHL.life: ‘‘it therefore seems likely
that the precise sequence of
the bases is the code which
carries the genetical infor-
mation.’’ Sixty years on and
shorn of the opening condi-
tional phrase, something like
these words is uttered in
biology classes around the
world every single day.
The story of how Watson,
Crick, and so many others
came to hunt for the structure
of DNA is well known (Wat-
son, 2012). What is far less
well understood is how Wat-
son and Crick came to use
those key ideas that look so
obvious to us now—‘‘code’’
and ‘‘information.’’ In 1940—
when Oswald Avery began
his final search for the ‘‘trans-
forming agent’’ in bacteria,
which, in 1944, would culmi-
nate in the discovery that thehereditary material is DNA—neither of
these ideas existed as biological con-
cepts. The way these fundamental ideas
entered biology in the 1940s reveals
surprising interconnections between dif-
ferent aspects of science at the time.
Schro¨dinger’s Code
In February 1943, the Nobel-Prize-
winning physicist Erwin Schro¨dinger
gave a series of public lectures in Dublin
that were later collected under the title
What Is Life? In these lectures, Schro¨-
dinger looked at recent findings in
biology, including the nature of mutations
and the size of genes (Schro¨dinger, 1944).
The exact role of Schro¨dinger’s book in
the development of molecular biologyCellhas been the subject of argument among
participants and historians (e.g., Kay,
2000; Pauling, 1987; Yoxen, 1979). What-
ever the case, the book did inspire many
of those who came to focus their lives
on the structure of DNA and of genes—
James Watson, Francis Crick, Maurice
Wilkins, and Seymour Benzer, among
others. Above all, Schro¨dinger was the
first person in the 20th century to explicitly
suggest that genes contained what he
called a ‘‘code-script’’ that determined
‘‘the entire pattern of the individual’s
future development and of its functioning
in the mature state.’’
Schro¨dinger’s idea looks so prescient
that it is tempting to conclude that it
must have directly influenced Watson153, April 25and Crick’s thinking a decade
later. But neither Watson
and Crick, nor indeed many
people, appear to have
been struck by Schro¨dinger’s
code-script idea. The term
was noted in Nature, but
simply as a synonym for ‘‘a
genome,’’ and in the New
York Times, but merely as
something ‘‘that gives orders
which are carried out.’’
In an early attempt to
investigate the idea that
genes contain a ‘‘code,’’
Kurt Stern developed amodel
of helical nucleoprotein mole-
cules in which the nucleic
acid chains were modulated
in combination with polypep-
tide chains, similar to ‘‘the
modulations impressed on a
smooth surface by the stylus
of a sound recorder’’ (Stern,
1947). At around the same, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 503
Norbert Wiener (1894–1964), the founder of ‘‘Cybernetics,’’ was a
brilliant mathematician who realized that most organic systems are
composed of feedback loops and also contributed to the recogni-
tion of information as a decisive feature of all systems.time, Erwin Chargaff not only
identified the proportions of
the different bases in samples
of nucleic acid, but also
began to consider the nature
of the code. At the 1947
Cold Spring Harbor Sympo-
sium, Chargaff suggested
that ‘‘differences in the pro-
portions or in the sequence
of the several nucleotides
forming the nucleic acid chain
also could be responsible for
specific effects’’ (Chargaff,
1947). By 1950, Chargaff
was explicitly arguing that
this was the case: ‘‘We must
realize that minute changes
in the nuclear acid, e.g.,
the disappearance of one
guanine molecule out of
a hundred, could produce
far-reaching changes in thegeometry of the conjugated nucleopro-
tein, and it is not impossible that rear-
rangements of this type are among the
causes of the occurrence of mutations’’
(Chargaff, 1950).
On closer inspection, Schro¨dinger’s
use of ‘‘code’’ was not at all like that of
Watson and Crick in 1953—he did not
think that there was a correspondence
between each part of the gene and
precise biochemical reactions, which
is what a code implies (Kay, 2000).
Although Beadle and Tatum had recently
shown that, in Neurospora, different
mutations affected specific enzymes,
Schro¨dinger was apparently unaware of
their work. So although Schro¨dinger
used the term code and explicitly sug-
gested that the hereditary molecule
(which, like virtually everyone else in
1943, he assumed was a protein) could
contain massive amounts of variability
that could act as the basis of that code,
he did not address the issue of what
exactly the code-script contained. One
reason for this difference between Schro¨-
dinger’s conception of code and that
used by Watson and Crick (1953) was
that, during the 10 years of tumultuous
discovery and conceptual exploration
that separated Schro¨dinger’s lectures
from the second 1953 Nature paper, a
key metaphor, completely absent from
Schro¨dinger’s thinking, entered into sci-
ence: information.504 Cell 153, April 25, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier InEnter Information
‘‘Information’’ became a key scientific
concept through the work of the US
National Research and Development
Committee, which was set up by Presi-
dent Roosevelt to fund scientific research
into military problems. It was initially
divided into four sections, including
one that would later become the
Manhattan Project. Section D-2 studied
‘‘fire control’’—how to ensure accurate
artillery fire, in particular antiaircraft fire,
by the integration of information from
radar, visual tracking, and range finding.
The director of D-2 was Warren Weaver,
the mathematical physicist who ran the
Rockefeller Institute and had coined the
term ‘‘molecular biology.’’
Among the men Weaver worked with
was Claude Shannon, a mathematician
from Bell Labs who had recently obtained
his PhD in the ‘‘algebra of theoretical
genetics’’ and was interested in both fire
control and codes. Shannon was inter-
ested in what he called ‘‘discrete informa-
tion’’ and the way that information often
contained redundancy. Another signifi-
cant figure in Weaver’s team was the
mercurial Norbert Wiener, a mathemati-
cian with an interest in control systems.
Wiener developed statistical approaches
to understand how the antiaircraft system
should respond to evasive action by the
aircraft, focusing on the control inter-
face between man and machine. Bothc.Shannon and Wiener shared
a central interest in the role
of feedback, control, and the
importance of information.
In 1944, Wiener teamed up
with computer pioneer John
von Neumann and organized
a series of meetings in which
engineers who studied con-
trol and communication could
discuss with scientists study-
ing biomedical questions.
Funded by the Rockefeller
Institute and the Macy Foun-
dation, these informal meet-
ings marked the beginning of
a sea change in the way
scientists viewed behavior
and physiology. The con-
cepts of control, feedback,
and information began to
seep into the scientific vocab-
ulary, words that would soonenable new hypotheses to be generated
and new experiments to be devised.
In 1948, the shift in thinking that had
been developing during the war years
finally exploded into the public domain in
three phases. First, Wiener published
Cybernetics: Or Control and Communica-
tion in the Animal and the Machine, in
which he proclaimed ‘‘the present time is
the age of communication and control.’’
Messages, codes, and information were
at the heart of Wiener’s vision, which
was acclaimed by academics and by
newspapers across the globe. Shortly
afterward, Shannon and Weaver pub-
lished The Mathematical Theory of Infor-
mation, in which they developed a general
mathematical framework that could apply
to any system, organic or inorganic, living
or electrical. Finally, at the 1948 Hixon
Symposium held in California, which was
attended by biologists such as Delbru¨ck
and Beadle, von Neumannn envisaged
a biological equivalent of a computing
machine able to reproduce itself with
a set of instructions corresponding to a
gene; in von Neumann’s striking view, a
gene was seen as an ‘‘information tape’’
that could program the organism—like
the ‘‘universal Turing machine’’ described
in 1936 by Alan Turing.
These approaches began to influence
thinking about what exactly genes
contain. In his popular 1950 book about
cybernetics, The Human Use of Human
Beings, Wiener argued that genes consti-
tuted a kind of ‘‘memory’’ that was ‘‘trans-
mitted’’ (yet another electronic term).
Information was the essence of life,
Wiener was now arguing, and the heredi-
tary material (which he assumed to be
proteins) was responsible for transmitting
that information. In 1950, Hans Kalmus
explicitly developed this idea in an article
entitled ‘‘A Cybernetical Aspect of
Genetics,’’ in which he described the
gene as a ‘‘message’’ of a ‘‘chemical
nature’’ (Kalmus, 1950). This was met
with a resounding silence—the first cita-
tion of the article was in 1962 by Kalmus
himself.
The power of the information or
message metaphor now looks obvious,
but at the time its impact was hindered
by the fact that it did not really explain
anything. Instead, it merely emphasized
the fundamental problem that so many
minds were concentrating on—the phys-
ical structure of the hereditary material.
Stating that a gene contained—or was—
information did not really help in under-
standing the key issue of the day, which
was how genetic specificity (or informa-
tion) was encoded in the DNA molecule.
Furthermore, attempts to apply the more
specific aspects of Shannon’s information
theory to biological problems proved diffi-
cult. In 1949, Henry Quastler estimated
the ‘‘information content’’ of a human
being at about 5 3 1025 bits (Kay, 1995).
At the same time, in an unpublished
sketch, Shannon suggested that the
‘‘genetic constitution of man’’ contained
slightly less than 105 bits of information
(Gleick, 2011). Neither of these esti-
mates was based on anything more than
guesswork.
An indication of what some of the
leading molecular biologists thought of
the fashion for cybernetics and infor-
mation theory can be gleaned from a
letter entitled ‘‘Terminology in Bacterial
Genetics,’’ which appeared in Nature the
week before Watson and Crick published
their April 1953 paper. The letter—which
was a spoof—had been cooked up in
September 1952 over a well-oiled lunch
by Boris Ephrussi, Jim Watson, and
others (Watson, 2001). They satirically
suggested that various terms used in bac-
terial genetics should be replaced by ‘‘in-
terbacterial information’’ and closed with
a reference to ‘‘the possible future impor-tance of cybernetics at the bacterial level’’
(Ephrussi et al., 1953). The editor did not
get the joke (to be fair, it was not very
funny), and he published the letter, lead-
ing historians to take the apparently bril-
liant insight equally seriously (e.g., Kay
[1995] considered that the letter
represented a ‘‘gestalt switch’’; even if it
was a joke, she was probably right).
Only 7 weeks separated the Ephrussi
et al. (1953) letter from Watson and
Crick’s second 1953 paper, but the con-
ceptual gulf was vast. Ephrussi and
Watson’s mickey taking was replaced by
serious, revolutionary science. In the
May 30, 1953 issue of Nature, Watson
and Crick addressed ‘‘the genetical impli-
cations of the structure of deoxyribonu-
cleic acid’’ and used the concept of
information in a way that fully expressed
the radical nature of their discovery—
‘‘the precise sequence of the bases is
the code which carries the genetical
information.’’ It is not known where this
powerful phrase came from—Watson
recalls that the paper was written in a
rush, in less than a week, in an attempt
to develop aspects of their model that
had been deliberately unstated in the first
paper (Watson, 2001). Whatever the case,
in the following years, the idea of informa-
tion and of a code was at the heart of the
key developments in genetics and molec-
ular biology, as various attempts were
made to crack what was now called the
genetic code, beginning with physicist
George Gamow’s July 1953 letter to
Watson and Crick (Watson, 2001) and
culminating in 1961 with Marshall Niren-
berg and Heinrich Matthaei’s brilliant
‘‘poly-U’’ experiment.
What Happened Next
Although code and information became
commonplace metaphors in biological
thinking in the 1950s, they were—and
are—merely vague ways of interpreting
genetic phenomena rather than pre-
cise theoretical frameworks. In fact,
Shannon’s strict version of information
turned out to be pretty much of a biolog-
ical dead end, for the time being at least.
On the other hand, information as a meta-
phor, with genetic information having
an instructional nature, has survived and
flourished. Cybernetics similarly failed
to fulfill its boastful promises of inte-
grating all levels of biology; however, itsCellemphasis on control and feedback loops
did prove extremely influential.
Jacques Monod, in particular, em-
braced the cybernetical approach—after
the ‘‘PaJaMa’’ experiments showed that
a single regulator gene controlled the
activity of several structural genes
through feedback loops, Monod explicitly
cast his work in the language of cyber-
netics. In 1959, he even began writing a
book called Enzymatic Cybernetics (Kay,
2000). Ephrussi and Watson’s satirical
wheeze that had fooled the editor of
Nature 6 years earlier had become
reality—cybernetics was being used to
understand bacteria. However, as with
information theory, it was the general
framework, rather than the precise math-
ematical detail, that was being employed.
Cybernetics became an analogy, a meta-
phor, a way of thinking about biological
processes, rather than a new science.
The final step in the link between
biology and the most recent develop-
ments in electronic technology took place
in 1961 when Jacob and Monod summa-
rized their view of gene function and pro-
tein synthesis. They used terms that are
both utterly modern and harked back
almost word for word to Schro¨dinger’s
view of the nature of the code-script:
‘‘the genome contains not only a series
of blueprints, but a coordinated program
of protein synthesis and the means of
controlling its execution’’ (Jacob and
Monod, 1961). The gene had entered the
computer age. According to this meta-
phor, not only did the genetic code
contain information, but this information
had a special kind of meaning—it was
a program, a set of instructions that
enabled the cell to carry out a particular
activity. However, it is easy to forget that
this is a figure of speech rather than being
literally true. A gene is like a program, but
it is not a computer program and does not
function according to the same rules.
Similarly, the genetic code is not literally
a code—it is a process that enables
organisms to carry out particular func-
tions by turning stored information into
structures or actions using evolved rules.
Science proceeds primarily by evi-
dence rather than by theory, and experi-
mentation is generally the most powerful
way of obtaining conclusive evidence.
But, to interpret this evidence, we need
theories and conceptual frameworks,153, April 25, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 505
which in turn are made up of words,
metaphors, and analogies that are often
based on the most recent technological
developments. This is powerfully shown
by the fusion of Schro¨dinger’s code-
script and Shannon’s information, which
occurred in the lucid prose of Watson
and Crick in their second article of 1953.
As they embraced this radical framework
and this new way of seeing, they trans-
formed our vision of life.
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